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Abstract
“Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted 
Warfighting Solutions
Version 1.0” : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph
by
Nyagudi Musandu Nyagudi – Security Analyst
Nations are today challenged with multiple constraints such as declining population and financial austerity, these inevitably 
reduce military/security forces preparedness.  Faced with well resourced adversaries or those of the asymmetric type, only a 
Nation that arms itself “intelligently” and fights “smart” attains advantages in the world's ever more complex and restrictive 
battle-spaces. Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that  
can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations
Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got  
proper empirically supported foundations.  Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, 
air and naval operations.  This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical  
forms  of  autonomous weapons,  that  address  the  gap between Police/Law Enforcement  and  Military operations that  is 
growing exponentially small.  
National  adversaries  are today in many instances  hybrid threats,  that  manifest  criminal  and military traits,  these often 
require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or  
Security objectives.  The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a 
very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a 
fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.
A theoretical solution by way of an Architectural Framework is rendered as a viable solution in this monograph.  It seeks to 
eliminate  the  practice  of  procurement  without  empirically  supported  deliberation.    Inappropriate  procurement  causes 
financial losses  and inefficiency in tactical operations when a weapon system is fielded, with the overall result being loss or  
diminishing of sovereignty.  Notably the most expensive and painful human endeavours  are unplanned military/security  
operations.  Weapons systems must be built with a wide range of operating environments and contingencies in mind, this 
can only be achieved if ample research precedes the design and development stages.
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Dedication
 To my beloved country the Republic of Kenya for all the sacrifices we have made to keep you safe, fully aware that the 
costly price of freedom is made bearable by way of timely preparation :  Security is a Lifestyle it is not a series of  
Temporary Measures.
“Isaiah 54 : 16 
Behold, I have created the blacksmith who fans the fire of coals, and brings forth a weapon for its work; and I have created 
the destroyer to destroy ”
so proclaims the Almighty YAHUEH, HalleluYAH Amen and Amen
combined Hebrew to English Translation of 
The Hebrew Tanakh
according to the  
Masoretic Texts and Jewish Publication Society Edition of  1917 [27] 
and 
Personal Translation
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Chapter One
Introduction
An autonomous weapon may be mobile or stationary, it is distinguished from manned weapon system types by way of pre-
loaded heuristics to undertake its C4ISTAR(Command, Communications, Control, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,  
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) and target interdiction functions.
Preloaded heuristics in an autonomous weapon system is designed to process data-streams from its sensors and to output a 
data-stream that induces a physical response in its actuators, that interact with the operational environment ( Figure A – 
Appendix A: The Exploratory Study).  Automated control systems architecture must specify the sensitivity of its sensors, the 
nature and data-stream from its sensors and the desired possible actuated response ranges.
Inevitably  there  are  many forms  of  electronic/electrical  “noise”,  that  are  found  on  a  system  and  prevent  its  perfect  
functioning.  These errors are minimized or eliminated by way of processing of control system feedback, thereby ensuring 
that  original  control  objectives  are  obtained.   Alternatively  filter  systems  remove  the   disturbances  that  are 
electrical/electronic “noise” from a circuit.
Of greatest concern to a weapon systems engineer are exceptional interference to control objectives as a result of :
1.  hardware malfunctions
2.  computational errors
3.  inadequacies in pre-loaded heuristics
4.  jamming by a third party
5.  hacking or any for of subversive control
In  this  monograph the  automated control  and  information systems described  are of  tactical  types for  military/security  
operations.  They are robots of many different forms and functions in warfighting, that are challenged by way of dynamic 
and hostile environments, in addition to exceptional unforeseen occurrences
Norms, exceptions, instability and environmental parameters are obtained by sensors and channeled as data-streams to an 
automated controlling system that bears the relevant pre-loaded heuristics.
The desired characteristics of feedback or incoming data-streams from sensors:
1.  minimum sensitivity that is representative of signal signatures of the operational environment
2.  data channels should have sufficient bandwidth/capacity to allow for realization of high fidelity data-
     streams.
3.  Noise must be filtered out of the data-streams wherever and whenever possible
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4.  Sensors should be specified and developed with the intention of error reduction
Actuators of mechanical types should have degrees of mechanical freedom that are sufficient for reaction to signal data-
streams.  Some factors considered are:
1. Can the actuators ensure that an autonomous vehicle/robot/device moves to a desired position and in the desired 
direction?
2. Does the automated system have projectiles, missiles, devices that could be launched in various missions? How far 
would such projectiles or vehicles travel from the mother-ship?  With what accuracy would they execute mission 
parameters?  Are these dependent vehicles also autonomous or are they dependent on the mother-ship for guidance 
and/or  control?
3. How powerful are the actuators in implementation of control decisions? Are they robust or unstable?
4. What are the energy consumption levels of actuators and a whole autonomous device?  Significantly low energy 
consumption rate translates to lower battery or fuel consumption hence a lighter design.
1.1  Background  
An important consideration in the design, development and fielding of autonomous weapons, is their anticipated missions.  
These missions are based upon threat modeling and threat characterization the scope of which could include ground, air 
and/or naval operational environments.  For example on the ground environment the anticipated threat could be those such  
as armed humans or main battle tanks, while in naval operational environment a submersible vehicle/robot may have a  
specific purpose, e.g. disarming of naval mines.  Some autonomous systems  could be wholly expendable  when they  
engage a target, while others may be designed in such a way that they track and engage several targets simultaneously 
before returning to the base.
The focus of the resultant architectural framework is to conceptualize the ways and means for maximizing the desired 
performance of an autonomous weapon within a wider C4ISTAR set-up.  It shall enable the nodes that are autonomous  
agents to tap into resources of the wider network, while at the same time contributing to the overall situational awareness 
and actualization of the desired goals in tactical security/military operations.
1.2  Contemporary Perspectives on Lethal Autonomy
Autonomous lethal weapons may be categorized into three groups:
Group (1) : Those that are dependent upon the absence of friendly forces or neutral elements in an area of operations if an  
attack is to succeed.
Group (2) :  Those that are dependent upon identification of friend or foe  systems borne by elements in a battle-space or  
area of operations
Group (3) :  Those that have humanitarian algorithms and machine learning hence the ability to respond to unforeseen  
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contingencies in the battle-space thereby preserving/protecting friendly or neutral elements in the battle-space.
With these designs there are additional specifications that are borne by a lethal autonomous weapon to assist its owners in 
obtaining its tactical objectives, e.g.:
1.  Autonomous nodes that act in conjunction with other autonomous weapons
2.  Effective and robust navigation systems that are equipped with varying levels of redundancies
3.  Centralized command centers monitoring various fielded autonomous weapons
4.  Autonomous systems that provide commanders with broad-spectrum situational awareness
5.  Autonomous systems that can act in collaboration  with other autonomous weapons and/or fielded forces
6.  Autonomous weapons that have concise awareness of their tactical objectives and the evolving 
     operations area
7.  Autonomous weapons that can survive attempted seizure or destruction by adversaries
Given the network integrated nature of many autonomous systems, there is always the risk that cyberwarfare shall be the  
ways and means of subverting [3] many such weapons, especially if they are dependent upon an open or easily  accessible 
communication medium.  This perception by system designers is the basis of what may be known as an ISOLATION 
POLICY.
THE TENETS OF ISOLATION POLICIES
Threats of cybercrime and cyberwarfare [4] must be considered when designing the data-links of autonomous weapon 
systems to command centres,  these are:
Rule 1 : Autonomous warfighting robots shall not have provisioning for interactive remote use, resetting or control from 
mainstream networks, communication media or communication protocols
Rule 2 : Feedback data-streams from autonomous warfighting robots shall be only one way type from the robot/weapon to 
the Command Centers.
Rule 3 : Encryption of all feedback to command centres from autonomous robots shall be by way of predetermined one-
time key sets for digital encryption.
Rule 4 : Autonomous warfighting systems must reduce and/or eliminate their operational reliability via data-links that are  
based upon degradable communication infrastructure
Rule 5 : Isolation of systems blueprints from the wider Internet, that is the work domain of hackers and others involved in 
theft of data or trade of the same.
Isolation policies ensure that military/security forces that use autonomous warfighting robots, isolate them in a technically 
sufficient way to reduce or eliminate their dependence of publicly accessible communication networks.  The embrace of  
“isolation”  in  autonomous  warfighting  robot  networks,  may  contradict  developmental  objectives  of  certain  open 
architectural  frameworks  in  the  long run.   However  they offer  some level  of  assurance  that  the  reliability of  critical  
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autonomous robot warfighting networks shall not be compromised by way of a cyberattack from an adversary [5].
Remote controlled weapons were used by Germans in World War I when remote controlled electrical motor boats were  
deployed  for  littoral  area  C4ISTAR duties  [6].   These  were  not  autonomous  weapons,  notably  the  challenge  of  use  
autonomous weapon system comes about primarily when the systems are deployed without 'a human in the loop' – this 
introduces  the perception of  moral   disengagement  of  the combatants  (who can  be the user,  the buyer,  programmers,  
analysts,  commanders,  etc.).   To  this  extent  some schools  of  thought  propose  that  such  systems only be  utilized  for 
defensive purposes.
There are many International Humanitarian Law rules [7] such as the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, Rome 
Statutes, Responsibility to Protect, etc. many of these apply readily in the domain of automated warfighting.  The underlying 
humanitarian concepts therein are:
1.  Target identification and discrimination before an attack is carried out
2.  Use of military force that is proportional to the threat that is posed by an adversary
3.  Ability to abort an attack when target status changes, e.g. a surrender
4.  Avoidance of mistreating the wounded
Given the detailed demands of International Humanitarian Law, an autonomous warfighting agent must not only perceive its 
environment  but  also detect,  designate and track potential  targets  therein.   It  must  have a way of  establishing if  it  is  
necessary to engage the target with its weapons.  Perception of a target does not only involve physical identification, it also  
includes determination as to whether the potential target in question is a friend, foe or neutral.
Missions undertaken with use of autonomous warfighting agents may be viable if it  is equipped with a wide range of  
sensors, such as: millimetre wave radars, thermal imaging, acoustic signature detection, seismic sensors, olfactory sensors,  
etc.  The process of targeting would take the following stages:
Stage 1 – Search
Stage 2 – Target Acquisition
Stage 3 – Target Designation
Stage 4 – Target Tracking
Stage 5 – Weapons 'Locking on Target'
Stage 6 – Weapon Launching and Target Interdiction
Stage 7 – Battle Damage Assessment
There is no limit to the extent of applicability of new technological innovations in the domain of Lethal Autonomy.  For  
example with application of principles  such as  those set  out  in Lee [8],  autonomous unmanned aerial  vehicles could 
communicate with autonomous ground vehicles via projected light.  This would allow for the projection of a single message 
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simultaneously to various robots in one geographical area, while at the same time minimize the risk of the message being  
intercepted.
With  such  a technique  improvements  could  be  rendered  by unmanned aerial  vehicles  communicating with unmanned 
ground vehicles, using techniques such as quantum optronics to further codify projector messages, to geo-specific projection 
areas while at the same time minimizing problems such as projection area boundary region data corruption.  
The  scope  and  applicability  of  autonomy  in  warfare  is  broad,  its  applications  are  multifaceted,  and  there  is  an  
“astronomically” big potential for innovation.
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Chapter Two
The Architectural Framework 
Architectural Frameworks [9] in the domain of military/security, ensures that weapon systems obtained(by way of design 
and  development  or  purchase)  meet  and/or  supersede  the  specified  mission  requirements.   Weapon  systems  are  too  
important to be procured by way of hunches, intuition and impulse, and the consequences of their malfunction and under 
performance has a detrimental effect on their user’s national sovereignty.  It  is prudent to obtain empirically justifiable  
reasons to back any weapon systems procurement decision.
Mission requirements for a weapon system include concepts such as: logistical support, reliability, durability, survivability,  
interoperability,  etc.  Architectural frameworks allow for comprehensive evaluation of weapon system performance and 
make all components and aspects borne on such systems easy to subject to an audit/evaluation in the event of an accident,  
malfunction, or under performance.
Frameworks  enable  an  establishment  to  compare  and  qualify  systems offered  by different  suppliers  in  response  to  a  
particular mission requirement.  Over the systems service lifespan, Architectural Frameworks could be re-stated to facilitate  
for  the  implementation  of  upgrades,  retrofits  and  maintenance,  ensuring  that  the  system  in  question  remains 
relevant/compatible with ever changing mission requirements.
2.1  Threat Characterization
Weapons are tools specifically for neutralizing threats of aggression against  our beings or interests.  The likelihood of  
vulnerabilities being actualized by threats is known as the risk.  Many states today find themselves confronted by hybrid 
threats  [10] that deploy regular(conventional) warfare methods in addition to irregular(terrorism, crime, asymmetric, illicit 
trade, etc.) methods.  This implies that to confront an adversary of the hybrid nature, a state must deploy both military 
means and policing/law enforcement methods – this increases the complexity of  autonomous lethal weapon development  
due that the fact that there is not only the requirement of compliance with military law and battle-spaces but an additional  
requirement for compliance with criminal law and an appreciation of day to day social norms.
A prominent example of a hybrid threat in the region of the Horn of Africa is the Al Shabaab Movement based in Somalia.  
Other international examples of hybrid threats include the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed  
Forces of Colombia, etc.
Some of the issues that create the felt need for lethal autonomous weapons are:
1.  The calculation that experienced warfighters are not worth exposing to the risk of death in the hands of 
     less experienced persons in the course of military/security operations
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2.  Awkward position of responding forces in a battle-space in cases where an adversary initiates hostile 
     actions
3.  Greater propensity of commanders to accept risk exposure of autonomous lethal weapons that are 
     searching and securing a building hence the likelihood to end a siege/hostage situation much faster than 
     a human-fighter
4.  An autonomous weapon system can acquire, retain and exploit total knowledge of a battle-space layout 
Even with the above listed tactical advantages there are the challenges such as:
1.  Non-combatant identification
2. The ability of autonomous robots to rescue hostages, e.g. to carry away children from a hostile 
    environment, win the confidence of victims, handle infants, give first aid to injured persons, and remove 
    injured persons from hostile environments
3.  Autonomous conduct of hybrid human and autonomous robot tactical operations
4.  Energy issues : battery/generator types, fuel and/or battery energy densities, etc.
5.  Mean Time Between Failures
Threats are not only perceived by an autonomous system, they are borne and created by the same.  Intrinsic threats are the 
most difficult to handle as they are not detectable by the autonomous platform in most cases.  Extrinsic threats may be  
characterized in the following fashion:
1.  Frequency of their effective projection and execution by an adversary
2.  Consequences of their execution e.g. fatality, lethality, incapacitation, etc.
3.  Distance from which they can be projected and executed to achieve an adversary's operational goals
4.  Ready availability/existence of the threatening entity
5.  Vulnerabilities of the threatened
6.  Ability of a threatening entity to impair critical functioning of targeted entities
7.  Survivability of a threatening entity, its ability to use counter-measures against attack or to evade attacks
8.  Level of sophisticated reasoning and planning borne by a threatening entity
For  entities  engaging  in  irregular  warfare  such  as  terrorists  [11]  there  are  many more  factors  to  be  consider  by the 
programmers of lethal autonomous weapons that operate against them.  Some of the issue to be considered are:
1.  Ability of an organization to carry out its activities in multifaceted environment(eg. Air, ground and sea)
2.  Mental and doctrinal inclination of combatants
3. Ability of a threatening entity to implement an unanticipated and extraordinary conversion of an 
  apparently 'innocent' item to a lethal weapon, e.g. the use of civil airliner as missiles in the 9/11 attacks in 
  New York
4.  Organization structure and discipline or the lack of the same
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5.  Profile of targets and victims who are attacked or terrorized
Even with all their characteristics threats do not just occur at random, they are developed and actualized by persons who  
have specific knowledge, intention and resources.  These are persons who are of interest to developers of lethal autonomous 
weapons,  as  they may constitute  a  hybrid  threat  aspect  that  demands  for  computer  algorithms  and  machine  learning  
capabilities for irregular warfare.
2.2  Systems Architecture Framework
Information Systems including those  that  are  at  the  centre  of  autonomous lethal  weapons  must  comply to  Local  and  
International  Legal  requirements.   There may be an exception to  this  requirement  as  pertains  to  Information Systems  
controlling  lethal  autonomous  weapons,  that  are  owned  or  used  by  Intelligence  Agencies  which  have  quasi-criminal 
organizations and are only loyal  to their paymasters.   There are many detailed expert  opinions on issues pertaining to  
International Humanitarian Law, Information Systems and lethal autonomous weapon.  Schmitt [12] gives a perspectives 
that has now become widely accepted within the ranks of the United States of America Armed Services.  It lays out details  
of characteristics, requirements and consequences of lethal autonomous weapons and their controlling systems.
The pursuit of “smart” systems in warfare is not unlimited but constrained, in the recommendations of McCullough et al  
[13] on Strategic and Leadership Recommendations there is the strong opinion that “strong artificial intelligence” should 
not be deployed on unmanned systems to the extent that resultant weapon systems can learn of their own tactical decisions  
and make completely independent final decisions without any pre-loaded constraining heuristics.  This view is rendered to  
the effect that “strong artificial intelligence” would result in completely autonomous and unpredictable weapon systems and 
situation that cannot be allowed to occur by any responsible Commander.
Lin, P, et al [14] was an early attempt to specify without codifying the algorithms, heuristics and/or modules that should be  
borne by a well-engineered information system that is at the core of any wholesome lethal autonomous weapons system. 
Upon review the key process identified in the document may be laid out in a flow-type diagram, as in Figure 1 on the next  
page.
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Figure 1 : Key Processes in a Generic Autonomous Lethal Weapon System (Intuitively Labeled)
The higher the frequency that a lethal autonomous agent can go through the processes in Figure 1, starting with its world  
view – the faster its execution of its “Observe, Orient, Detect and Actions” Loop. A faster OODA loop implies that a system 
is more effective when fielded against to similar system but with a lower OODA loop frequency rate while performing the 
processes laid out on the flow chart.    
Another  important  parameter  would  be  the  size  of  the  “world  view”  of  the  information  system,  how much  relevant  
information does it have?  Lack of sufficient “world view” dimensions would render the usage of the system to very limited  
situations, while too expansive a “world view” would imply that a system has been implemented using “strong artificial  
intelligence”  and  is  able  to  independently  set  out  its  tactical  objectives  obtain  them  and  determine  its  own  mission 
parameters.   Complete  autonomy of the  “strong artificial  intelligence” kind is  undesired  in  the  realm of  International 
Humanitarian Law for reasons that systems of such nature would be unpredictable and potentially lethal or damaging to the 
owning military force.
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Navigation and Searching
Target Acquisition and Tracking
Identification as Friend or Foe
Challenge or Warning
Ignore/Inaction
Disable Kill/Destroy
World view of events and tactical situation with “sufficient” information and learning
Assessment of executed tactical objectives
Systems development reviews are important in the course of implementation of a Systems Architecture, they guarantee that  
an autonomous agent shall be tested and realistically calibrated in an operational environment that is similar if not the same 
as that of its eventual deployment.  Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in systems heuristics is also improved 
and secured by pre-deployment systems reviews.
Additional codification efforts should be undertaken in the domain of the autonomous robots' perception.  Their “world  
view” must not only be extensive but also fine grained and intensive.  The robots must:
1.  Recognize human beings
2.  Recognize human interests
3.  Recognize local and “global” implication of its actions
4.  Subvert or override adversary systems
5.  Recognize an adversary's threat potentials
6.  Analyze available options and possibilities
7.  Determine the available ways and means in relation to dynamic mission requirements
There is a possibility that a lethal autonomous system that has “weak artificial intelligence” could develop “strong artificial  
intelligence” on its own accord if it  is endowed with sufficient Genetic Algorithm Mechanisms and Machine Learning  
Capabilities.   In  this  regard a system that  is  fairly predictable and well  tuned to  adhere to the tenets of  International 
Humanitarian Law may become self “willed” and unpredictable in the long run.  To prevent the possibility of self-evolving 
rogue autonomous lethal weapons, a requirement must specify the use of fixed/robust algorithm rule sets in addition to  
machine learning technologies on a platform.  All said and done there are some common military concepts that are not easy 
to codify into an information system e.g. acknowledgment of commanding authority, proportionality in combat – avoiding 
overkill, and justification of missions.
Schmitt and Thurnher [12] demonstrates that the legitimacy of military technologies from the perspective of International  
Humanitarian Law is based upon the prevailing technologies and their availability at the time being considered.  Technology 
that may be discriminate and proportionate today may very well be considered to be an indiscriminate overkill in the future.  
To ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law autonomous lethal weapon system require continuous legal 
reviews before manufacturing, during manufacturing, during use and during maintenance.  Without effective legal reviews a 
simple software upgrade in control heuristics of a lethal autonomous weapon could very easily result in a completely or  
partially illegal autonomous control system.
Docherty [15] offers a similar approach to design and implementation of autonomous lethal  weapons.  It  suggests the 
Arkin's Ethical Governor which would be implemented on binary checks on the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement.  A 
weapon system would thereafter be controlled by way of statistical and sensor-based algorithms, that would determine the  
likelihood of target interdiction within the confines of International Humanitarian Law.
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On the issue of Command Centres for lethal autonomous robots, the following capabilities would be required:
1.  empathy with those who are fielded
2.  knowing when, how and why tactical objectives would be obtained
3.  rationalization of ways and means for obtaining tactical objectives
4.  verification and assessment of execution of operations for obtaining tactical objectives
5.  collaboration of allied forces
6.  justification of operations and giving superiors and the general public briefings
7. procurement, deployment and maintenance of new systems
Though “strong artificial intelligence” is yet to be accepted as a means of on-board control of lethal autonomous weapons, it 
would serve as welcome addition for use in their related Command Centres.   “Strong artificial intelligence” would boldly  
put to a military Commander difficult questions, that may results in inconveniences that would not be obtained if they were  
occasioned  by  a  sub-ordinate  officer.   An  information  system  would  place  appropriate  questions  to  military/security 
commanders on : the “what ifs”, probable loopholes and pit falls, as well as challenging resolutions that may be fallacies 
stemming from group thinking.  
The Command Center would be easily overlooked by the supply side of a lethal autonomous weapons – specifically because 
of the presumed independence of such a weapon.  But the wider objective of deploying lethal autonomous weapons is for  
reasons of benefiting specific military/security organizations of the interests of the wider society that they represent.  For  
those  reasons  it  would  not  be  tenable  for  a  military/security  organization  to  haphazardly  field  all  manner  of  lethal 
autonomous  weapons  that  cannot  be  monitored  via  their  on-board  reporting  mechanisms  or  tracked  or  co-ordinated 
accordingly.
A Command Center inevitably brings about the issue of the data-links that enable it to control and co-ordinate various field  
entities.   The  specification  frameworks  for  such  data-links  is  laid  out  on  the  Technical  Architecture   section  of  this  
monograph.  
Data-link requirements are laid out on the basis of available technologies and System Architecture, the key considerations 
are that the data-links must facilitate transfer of generated information from the lethal autonomous robot to the Command 
Centre.   Information required by commanders and generated by a weapon would include navigation, targeting, rate of 
consumption of on-board resources, malfunctions, sensor data-streams, etc.  Given the probable likelihood of Information 
Overload at a Command Centre, “strong artificial intelligence” may assist commanders in fully exploiting what may be  
difficult to discern and high tempo information – these are likely to be “wasted” if left for handling by way of unaided  
human capabilities.
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2.3  Technical Architecture Framework
A wide range of standards and conventions ought to be actualized if truly lethal autonomous weapons are to be realized.  
There would be the initial hardware platform and software environment issues, these would be at the core of the system.  An 
autonomous  lethal  system would  be  required  to  address  a  certain  level  of  Problem Complexity  –  depending  on  the  
technology available for on-board computing, this would have a direct impact on the weight, dimensions, functionality, and 
size of the weapon in question.  Some basic technical modules on-board a lethal autonomous weapon would be:
1.  guidance and navigation module, eg. Auto-pilot,
2.  power and resources management module
3.  application/user interface module, for reprogramming and maintenance at the home based of via remote  
     control.
4.  targeting/tactical module
5.  communications/data-link module
6.  self-diagnostics and self-healing modules
7.  electronic counter-measures module
8.  electronic counter counter-measures module
Technically speaking a more sophisticated autonomous weapon would have more technical modules of varying complexity. 
There are however great limitations on the ability of many anticipated lethal autonomous weapons to carry on-board the  
requisite  computational  power  that  would  allow  for  the  resolution  of  exponential  time  computational  difficulty  type 
problems within desired time ranges.  These functions would inevitably be resolved by computation power that would be 
resident at a Command Centre, this technical challenge adds to the burden of developing a secure and tamper proof data-
link to facilitate full and proper functioning of a lethal autonomous weapon that utilizes off-board computational power in  
some cases.
There shall never be sufficient computational power on-board a lethal autonomous weapon and the temptation to source for  
more computation power externally shall create both technical and information security challenges for systems architects.  
Relative to advances in the scientific world even if all the computational power in the world today could be compressed  
onto an on-board platform of some military robot, by the time that such an advance became possible, there would be even  
more external computational power available for lethal autonomous weapons.
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Figure 2 : Key Technical Standards required in a Generic Autonomous Lethal Weapon System
                        Feedback Signals                                                                                  Actuation Signals
Mother-ship Layers : Layers 1 to 6 are found within the primary device/vehicle that  is  why they are classified as the 
“Mother-ship” Layers.  Layer 7 is the “Force field” layer it comprises of radio-frequencies, audio sonar signals, lasers, 
gases, liquids and/or substances, that are projected into the Operational Environment by the Mother-ship and are used to 
make measurements/detections of various kinds.  The final layer comprises of sub-ordinate vehicles or devices that are 
borne by the Mother-ship and deployed in the operational environment outside the Mother-ship and are manipulated, control 
or  communicated with via the active Force field layer.   Sub-ordinate vehicles/devices may be a swarm that  works in 
synchronized fashion via artificial intelligence or a collection of vehicles/devices that work in tandem as a signal relay.
An example of operations conducted by sub-ordinate vehicles/devices would be an unmanned aerial vehicle dropping small  
crawling robots on to the ground for target  verification and assessment.   Given that  some of the target  may be inside  
buildings, the crawling robots may position themselves such that some go into the building and some remain outside the  
building as signal relays.  Once inside the building a crawling robot would take a photo, DNA sample, etc. and send the  
results via a signal relay of other crawling robots to the Mother-ship that is an unmanned air vehicle.  There is no limit to 
this concept  as a sub-ordinate vehicle/device could also be a Mother-ship to other  sub-ordinate vehicles/devices.   The  
selection  of  data-links  for  these  multifaceted  operations  would  depend  of  factors  such  as  energy  densities  of  battery 
technologies, prevention of jamming and interference, etc.
Functions of the Layers:
Layer 1  :  Tactical objectives the desired outcomes issued to an autonomous lethal weapon by its owners/users
Layer 2  :  Automated control options are the suggested methodologies for obtaining tactical objectives
Layer 3  :  Implementing heuristics select and execute the most appropriate automated control decision
Layer 4  :  Digital signals are generated to actualize the implementing heuristics
Layer 5  :  Hardware generates and bears the digital signals that are convey from the sensors and to the actuators
Layer 6  :  Sensors perceive the environment while actuators manipulate the environment 
Layer 7  :  Force field are aspects of the operational environment that are manipulated by the autonomous platform 
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Layer 1:  Tactical Objectives
Layer 2:  Autonomous Control Options
Layer 3:  Implementing Heuristics
Layer 4:  Digital Signals
Layer 5:  Hardware/Circuits
Layer 6:  Actuators and Sensors
Layer 7:  Force field
Layer 8:  Sub-ordinate vehicle/device
                  then monitored for purposes of surveillance or control
Layer 8  : Sub-ordinate vehicle/device is launched from, controlled and/or monitored from the Mother-ship for 
                 purposes of enhancing its off-board capabilities within the operational environment
Some level of independent decision making is expected from an autonomous lethal weapon, this implies that an adversary 
must develop a specific attack type if the autonomous lethal weapon system is to be subverted.  These specific attack types  
are directed at specific layers of the system, hence a requirement that specific layers must have specific in-built counter-
measures.   The  following  are  some  attack  types  vulnerabilities  that  an  autonomous  weapon  system  designer  should  
anticipate and work to prevent on the fielded system:
Layer 1 Attacks :  Attacks against programmers and commanders, these can be physical or mental
Layer 2 Attacks :  Sabotage embedded into the system inform of hardware, software, firmware at procurement
Layer 3 Attacks :  Malicious code introduced via data-links into the system
Layer 4 Attacks :  Electromagnetic pulse attacks and microwave attacks
Layer 5 Attacks : Kinetic and non-kinetic direct attacks against sensors and actuators
Layer 6 Attacks : Implanted counter-measures(sabotage) – credibility problems within ranks of system users/owners
Layer 7 Attacks : Jamming/interference, decoys, etc.
Layer 8 Attacks : all possibilities from Layer 1 Attacks all the way to Layer 7 Attacks
There are various standards to protect systems from these threats, organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
International Organization for Standardization, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, United States Department of 
Defence  standards,  etc.   these  would  be  applied  either  at  the  point  of  systems  design  and  development  or  used  for 
verification at the point of procurement decisions.  It would be improper to give specific standards in this monograph as it is 
a framework and not a definitive view for any autonomous weapon system.
With standards come the additional  challenges of testing and calibration, verification and validation, once as system is 
deployed there is the continuous practice of monitoring and evaluation.  In practice not only are current threats and issue for  
concern but new and emerging threats that  may render an autonomous system obsolete or inefficient  in its domain of  
operations.  Various retrofits of sensors and actuators are undertaken, in addition to upgrades of both hardware and software  
components.  Upgrades may be easily undertaken if an autonomous weapons system was built in modular fashion, such that  
older components can be unplugged and new components plugged in, followed by rebooting and reconfiguration.
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Figure 3 : Generic Autonomous Lethal Weapon System – Fail Safe / Fault Tolerance Mechanisms
(Autonomous “Molecular” Topology – preferably on a integrated circuit chip)
Levels of topological manifestation of the “molecular” topology:
1.  macroscopic implementation
2.  microscopic implementation
3.  nanoscopic(eg. quantum device) implementation
4.  hybrid(combination) implementation
Macroscopic  implementation  :  In  typical  macroscopic  implementation  you  can  see  the  actual  capacitors,  resistors,  
transistors, and logic/controlling devices
Microscopic implementation : on chip based integrated circuit format
Nanoscopic implementation : too small for normal electronics instead quantum level manipulations occur.
Hybrid implementation : a combination of macroscopic, microscopic and/or nanoscopic circuit types for to meet a specific  
design requirement or to overcome the challenge of procurement of rare or unavailable components.
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The key concept behind the “molecular” topology is that system failure in one domain would not result in overall system  
failure which may have catastrophic effects.  For example if one auto-pilot module reads questionable data, other auto-pilot  
modules designed in different ways may read different data altogether.  The confidence modules would then allow through  
various reading that would be worked on by the “integrator” which would in effect only accept operational parameters that  
are of very high confidence levels, strange or outlier parameters shall be discarded.  
Another approach would be for example if an auto-pilot module in one chipset fails completely, data and functionality could 
still be obtained from other auto-pilot modules in the same or other chipsets.  No function or capability of the autonomous 
weapon would depend upon a single on-board component leading to a robust and highly dependable system.  To further 
improve the survivability of an autonomous lethal weapon platform, the “molecular” topology chips would be located on 
different parts of the platform, each with its own range of modules and a network of integrators to read their confidence 
levels all through the platform – thereby only executing the most appropriate parameters.
In the “molecular” topology a chipset performs some function(s), the integrity modules then filter out absurd or erroneous  
data from further consideration and application within the system.  After filtration of outlier data/parameters, the confidence 
module compares data-streams from a wide range of chipsets and gives a determination as to the level of confidence based 
upon its scoring frequency.  For example if several confidence modules working in synch make the determination by 89.9% 
that a vehicle is on the equator, then it is overwhelmingly probable that it is in the defined navigation area.  But levels of 
confidence may depend on the sensitivity of an operation, e.g.  in some operations a 50% level  of confidence may be  
acceptable while in other operations a 95% level of confidence may not be sufficient.  In future designs a chipset shall  
simulate brain neocortical column [24].
Data-streams that  are  marked  via  encapsulation as  being sufficient  are  thereafter  utilized  for  execution of  actuator  in  
navigation, control decision and tactical operations.  The implementation of “molecular” topology is not fixed and could 
take many other forms and components as its statement in this monograph is purely at conceptualization and basic functions 
level.  More complexities would inevitably crop up in the pursuit of “molecular” topologies for lethal autonomous weapons 
design, the most difficult would be the development of software for running the systems which in many cases would be 
proprietary due to the secret nature of their development.
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2.4 Operational Architecture Framework
Figure 4 : High level Operational Architecture
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In the Appendices, The Exploratory Study page 6 of 15 there is Figure A, that is a schematic of the middle-level Operational 
Architecture view of an autonomous lethal weapon system,  Figure 4 gives a higher-level Operational Architecture view of  
an autonomous lethal weapon system (Mother-ship) that has deployed sub-ordinate vehicle 4 to search inside a building and 
to relay its findings via the electromagnetic spectrum to a sub-ordinate vehicle 3 which then repeats the signal that is strong  
enough to be received by the mother-ship.  The mother-ship relays its signals via terrestrial radio-frequencies repeaters or  
satellite data-links to the command center for monitoring and evaluation.
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The mother-ship has on-board two more sub-ordinate vehicles that  it  can deploy for similar purposes,  these extend its 
capabilities of target search and interdiction as without the sub-ordinate vehicles it would not be in a position to discover or 
verify the  status  of  persons or  objects  in  a  building.   The set-up would further  enhance enforcement  of  International 
Humanitarian Law by way of reducing civilian/non-combatant casualties, allow for better assessment of proportional use of 
military force and if well designed it could assist in the conduct of physical battle damage assessments, that have previously  
been only possible by way of aerial and satellite photography.  The design assumption is that a sub-ordinate vehicle is  
equipped with the appropriate actuators and sensors – there is also the possibility that a sub-ordinate vehicle could be the  
mother-ship of another type of sub-ordinate vehicle.
Even with technologies that are currently in the market the various data-links can be specified for purposes of demonstrating 
the practical nature of this architectural view and not for reasons of placing a definitive specification.  There may be the  
restriction of attempting to process as much data as is technically possible on-board an autonomous platform and to utilize 
only one-way half-duplex communication to reduce and/or eliminate the risk of hacking and seizure of an autonomous 
platform by third parties.  A sample specification of the data-links at a high level may be as follows:
Data-link 1 :  Links sub-ordinate vehicle 4 to sub-ordinate vehicle 3 → eg. Wireless fidelity
Data-link 2 :  Links sub-ordinate vehicle 3 to mother-ship → eg. Very high frequency radio 
Data-link 3 :  Up-link from mother-ship to satellite 1 → eg. Optronic link of lasers with quantum encryption
Data-link 4 :  Link from satellite 1 to satellite 2 → eg.  Optronic link of lasers with quantum encryption
Data-link 5 :  Down-link from satellite 1 to terrestrial repeater → eg. Optronic link of lasers with quantum encryption
Data-link 6 :  Radio link from mother-ship to terrestrial repeater → eg. Very high frequency
Data-link 7 :  Up-link from terrestrial repeater to satellite 2 → eg. Optronic link of lasers with quantum encryption
Data-link 8 :  Radio-link from terrestrial repeater to command centre → eg. Microwave 
Data-link 9 :  Down-link from satellite 2 to command centre → eg. Optronic link of lasers with quantum encryption
Data-link 10 :  Command centre to high performance computing centre → Fibre-optic cablelink +10 Gigabits/sec.
A wide range of systems engineering decisions can be made in actualization of this architecture, e.g. transmission of video 
and graphics in monochrome to reduce bandwidth  and/or utilizing of schematics in place of videos.  Mission packages  
could be made such that particular tactical operations only have the required type of data-links and processing capacity on  
the mother-ship to  increase its  endurance without  refueling or  replenishment  of  any kind.   Energy replenishment  is  a  
particular problem in the domain of unmanned ground vehicles, unlike the human warfighter who can live off the land with 
minimal resources, the unmanned ground vehicle has got the challenge of fuel supplies and battery life.  Human muscles are 
highly efficient structures, apart from being a vital part of the actuators in the human body they also store energy for use –  
robots on the other hand need batteries or fuel tanks.
With an unlimited supply of power a robot fielded in combat may transform itself into a different entity or to use its power 
pack for camouflage illusions.  There are many things that a human fighter can do that many of the fighting robots in the  
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market today cannot. For example a human-fighter may create relationships with adversaries or non-combatants, yet a robot 
may not achieve the same.  The human-fighter is able in most instances to carry away wounded persons and to win their  
confidence, a robot may also fail in this respect – a robot may have the power to carry the wounded but may lack the  
sensitivity to avoid inflicting more injuries.  Other similarly challenging operations for a robot may be those such as picking 
locks, using objects found in its environment as weapons, breaching walls and doors, etc.
Weizman [16] details the views of two Israel Defense Forces commanders Brig. Gen. Aviv Kokhavi and Brig. Gen. (Rtd.)  
Shimon Naveh, pertaining to limiting exposure of ones forces to enemy fire during urban warfare.  It advocates for pursuit  
of tactical objectives in a city or town without going through readily available routes.  The result of this advice is breaching  
of new routes through buildings with use of sledge hammers, explosives, cutters, etc. in a process that is dubbed as Lethal  
Theory.  These innovative approaches to urban warfare are a challenge to replicate in the autonomous realm with readily 
existing technologies as of the year 2013.  Ability of robots to swing sledge hammers to break walls, breach roofs and floors  
with impunity, would require energy densities in robot power sources that allow for the equivalent of heavy duty human  
work or surpassing the same.
Weizman [16] brings in the concept of full and unhindered autonomous movement in the urban realm, to the extent that a  
warfighter  is  able  to  breach  any  obstacle/impediment  to  movement.   With  fully  autonomous  movement  capability  a 
warfighter would easily outmanoeuvre adversary forces in the urban realm as they would not expect to be attacked from a  
new direction of approach that did not exist prior to the fighting.  An autonomous lethal robot designed to implement “lethal  
theory” should have the ability to interpret architecture and civil structures,  without restrictions of avoidance of walls,  
floors, roofs, and other non-transit areas.  At the same time progress of the robot would be reported to high command via  
some implementation of  high-level  operational  architecture.   In  effect  an efficient  autonomous lethal  robot  would not 
comply with an adversary's expectation for pre-specified transit route.
Each and every data-link relaying commands and information to and from the robot/weapon requires specification for a  
particular range of tactical operations.  Specification of interest would include but not be limited to : Transmission power; 
type  of  computing processes,  actuators  and  sensors  that  are  communicating with off-board  systems –  as  these  would  
describe the information being exchanged; security and counter counter-measures implemented in the data-link; amount of 
information exchange required internally and externally for efficient operation of the robot/weapon; tempo of work that is 
generating the information; rate of consumption of the information by external systems; ability of robot/weapon to establish 
data-links with other systems to facilitate interoperability; etc.  Note: the greater the information throughput the higher the  
energy consumption
2.5  Potential Applications
In the course of research work of this monograph the Westgate [17] Terror Attack occurred in Nairobi,  Kenya on 21st 
September 2013 and lasted for four days. A group of about 8 to 15 armed gunmen engaged the Kenya Defence Forces and  
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the Kenya Police in indoor fighting at a Shopping Mall located in Peponi Road, Westlands Area of Nairobi.  Not only did 
the military and security forces engage in indoor fighting but they also had to secure the wider area to prevent escape or  
reinforcement of the gunmen.  There were a wide range of challenges that were encountered in the course of the fighting 
that may be of interest to a developer of a lethal autonomous system, eg.:
1. is  there  an  autonomous  robot  that  can  be  deployed  to  carry  out  tricky  operations  such  as  first  aid,  rescue,  
negotiations, etc.?
2. could the deployment of autonomous robots assist military/security forces to reduce the risk of loosing highly 
experienced and expensive to train warfighters in the hands of less experienced persons?
3. what  are the threats  and opportunities  in  conducting tactical  operations that  involved autonomous robots  and 
human warfighters?
4. Autonomous robot sentries may guard valuables such as jewels, cash, food, etc. from exploitation by the terrorists 
while other aspects of the tactical operation are conducted.  They would be less inclined to misappropriate would 
they use or remove, and would keep a digital record of the same
5. Networked  autonomous  weapons  could  identify  adversaries  via  long  range  facial  recognition  or  by  firing 
projectiles  that  are  sub-ordinate  devices  that  can  embed  themselves  on  an  attacker  and  report  his/her  
Deoxyribonucleic  Acid  profile.   Allowing  for  positive  identification  of  adversaries  before  they  are  killed  or 
captured.
6. The ability of an autonomous robot to search the building would be much faster due to its greater propensity to 
expose itself to risk of destruction or damage, than human willingness to expose oneself to harm/injury or death 
when searching a building or other battle-space type
7. Ability  of  an  autonomous  robot  with  in-built  electronic  warfare  suite  to  intercept  and  exploit  terrorists  
communications via phone or radio.  During the siege, security/military forces did not have full exploitation on the 
electromagnetic spectrum, ie. They did not have an 'Electronic Order of Battle' mapping out the electromagnetic  
signals  in  the vicinity.   In  addition to  'identification friend  of  foe  systems'  an  electronic  warfare  suite  in  an  
autonomous robot may end a siege faster by tracking down adversaries as they use radio-frequencies and prevent 
incidents of friendly fire by detecting presence of friendly forces.
8. An autonomous robot fighting within a city or a building could be plugged into the close circuit television system 
to give it an augmented perception of the battle-space, in turn the robot may also communicate with the hostages 
and terrorists via data-links with the building intercom system or the phones or radios that they are using during the  
incident
There are very many limits to use of the 'Westgate Terror Attack' as a benchmark for feasibility of potential deployment of 
lethal autonomous weapons.  Notably the terrorists were restricted to ground fighting which did not have a naval aspect –  
but there was an air component of the Kenyan side comprising of helicopters and planes.  The fighting environment was  
primarily urban and indoors.  The face-off between the Kenya Defence Forces and Al Shabaab inside “Westgate” Mall was  
asymmetric in nature – the Kenyan Military was endowed with a home advantage and broad array of technical capabilities.  
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Ground, naval and air warfare between  well equipped adversaries with proper military training, is a ultra-high tempo affair,  
with gains or losses in the billions  of dollars range are quantified by the millisecond and thousands of tactical operation  
instances are executed in similar time.
More technologies [18] are now available in the market that would facilitate for the development and use of autonomous  
lethal  weapons,  an  example  is  the  development  of  Advanced  Extremely High  Frequency satellites  with  data-links  of 
8.1megabits per second and Active Electronically Scanned Antennae technology that makes it easier for ground-stations and 
satellites  to  establish  connectivity.   The  advantage  of  these  technologies  would  be  to  provide  beyond-line-of-sight 
communication between autonomous lethal weapons and command centres.  Though high capacities for data-transmission 
exist in civilian technologies, they cannot be deployed in remote and unsupported environments, hence the emphasis on  
bandwidth provision via independent military satellites.
Other innovations that are gaining rapid acceptance in the market are “throwables” [19] that are robots that can be deployed  
into a building/battlespace via an awkward and unplanned throw.  If  equipped with appropriate artificial  intelligence a  
throwable robot could search for and locate items and persons, map out buildings, avoid/breach obstacles to allow for the 
odd “look-around-the-corner”.  With appropriate data-links throwable robots would promptly furnish their users with audio, 
video or other data as pertains to conditions in its operating environment.
Throwables by their very nature as robots are rugged and retrievable, on the extreme end of the robot spectrum are the  
“One-way-Ticket” drones/robots [20], once launched or deployed into a battle-space these use various homing techniques to 
lock on to target signatures and navigate to their locations before attacking.  In the resultant attacks the drones/robots as well 
as the target are destroyed.  There are many drones with this capability such as the Israeli Harpy and the German TARES. 
Given  the  nature  of  these  drones,  they are  usually deployed  against  high  value  targets  such  as  radars  and  command 
installations.  
The growth of tactical internet [21] technologies provide an open standard for connecting to, configuring and manipulating 
the user interface of a fielded autonomous weapon.  Tactical internet enables shared control and exploitation of the on-board  
resources, via remote control.  These are important in control and integrating systems such as the autonomous Kongsberg  
Crows Weapon Station [22] for Forward base protection used in land warfare.
Lethal Autonomy has spread to highly specialized military roles such as submarine warfare [23] there are various types of 
unmanned underwater vessels such as the anti-submarine continuous trail unmanned vessel, conceptualized by the Defense  
Advanced Research Projects  Agency of the United States  of America.   It  is  capable of trailing a modern silent  diesel 
submarine over an eighty day period and has an operational range of about several thousand kilometres.  When tracking an  
adversaries submarine it is not distracted by other ships and promptly evades them.
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2.6  Conclusion    
Lethal autonomous weapons if well conceptualized, designed and engineered offer tactical advantages to military/security 
forces that possess and operate them.    Problems such as shortage of skilled military/security personnel could be alleviated  
to some extent by way of deployment of autonomous lethal weapon systems.  International Humanitarian Law can address  
the  issue  of  lethal  autonomous  weapons  if  and  when  they  are  considered  as  persons/combatants  –  otherwise   when 
considered  as  inanimate  objects  they could  undertake  operations  such  as  physical  transformation  to  innocent  or  non-
combatant mimicking entities that are lethal.
With rapidly evolving technologies eg. Further miniaturization of microchips and more efficient actuators and sensors, there 
is the promise that long endurance autonomous robots, shall be critical actors in today's battle-spaces.
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Chapter Three
The Findings
In this monograph it has been clearly demonstrated that sufficient knowledge and technology exist for the development of  
lethal autonomous weapons.  Extent of technical details is dependent upon many factors such as:
1. Complexity of components and systems available to a contractor
2. Fine-grained nature of current ethical, legal and tactical requirements
3. Extent of knowledge of systems architects and engineers
4. The ability of a targeted adversary to evade a lethal autonomous weapon and/or deploy counter-measures,  i.e. 
vulnerabilities of an adversary
5. Available C4ISTAR infrastructure for monitoring and/or intervening(during unanticipated contingencies).
6. Nature of the operator of the autonomous lethal weapon, e.g. police, military,  criminal/terrorist/non-state actor, 
intelligence agency
7. Urgency of deployment, i.e. time available for realistic research and development effort
In reality lethal autonomous systems today exhibit a limited scope of heuristics and machine learning capabilities, systems 
that are not fully capable of anticipating and reacting to all manner of contingencies.  A more controversial concept in  
autonomy would be that of Kantian autonomy [14: pp. 33, 64, 65, 84] if exhibited by a robot would result in pursuit of “best  
interests”, freewill and personal advancement, concepts which are currently only known to be embraced by living organism 
especially of the human type.  Some proponents assume that this state of affairs shall be possible within the next ten years or 
few more years – when the “Human Brain Project” of Henry Markram [24] and his peers manages to simulate a complete 
and realistic neocortical column of the human brain.
A simulated complete human neocortical column should enable the computer scientist and systems engineer to “implant” or 
install some measure of independent thinking into robots.  Whether this may be of immediate benefit to human owners of  
robots is highly debatable, as robot may make the independent decision that are its own robotic best interests and not that of 
the human owners/commanders.  With a model brain on-board an autonomous lethal weapon, many forms of thinking and  
decision processes become possible as a robot develops and evolves its own sophisticated world view.  Decisions would 
enhance  its  perception  to  the  extent  that  there  is  either  negative,  positive  or  neutral  feedback  from  its  operational  
environment that feeds the learning processes of the robot “brain”.
Even with the best on-board robot “brain” there is need as in human society for a person to consult experts for greater  
clarity on complex issues.  Lethal autonomous weapons shall utilize data-links of send complex queries to command centres  
and high performance computing establishments with the expectation of yielding efficiency.
A notion that International Humanitarian Law is sufficient in its current format to meet and address all challenges of lethal  
autonomous robots in warfare would only hold if it assumed that a robot is not a soldier.  If one is to assume that a robot is a  
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soldier many questions would arise as to the legitimacy of the following in conflict:
1. Self assembling robots that could reconfigure themselves into seemingly neutral objects
2. How to deal with the issue of military uniform, insignia or the lack of it
3. Whether a robot can be charged with the war crime of lethal treachery if it pretends to surrender then kills its  
victims as they attempt to process its surrender
4. Dependency of a lethal autonomous robot on civilian data-links and relays may lead to targeting of the same by an 
adversary as legitimate military objectives thereby causing human casualties
5. Lack of  knowledge of  algorithms and hardware that  constitute lethal  autonomous weapons may automatically 
render usage of the same by a military as a war crime, given that they would have failed in their obligation to  
institute a legal review of the said system within the context of International Humanitarian Law
Most of the autonomous robots/weapons reviewed in course of developing this architectural framework have very limited  
operational  scope and functionality.  A fully functional  combat robot capable of handling high computational  difficulty 
tactical situations and equipped with the required actuators may take a detailed technical specification that is beyond the 
scope of this research but based on the basic architectural framework described in the foregoing.  Tasks and capabilities are 
primarily in the domain of simple surveillance and their usage is in hybrid mode,  support of human tactical operatives,  
these  are not  the only autonomous combatants  in  the  market  today,  there  are many gun stations,  remote  sensing and 
detonating mines, etc.  Unlike the current human operatives the robots are yet to fully develop or be developed such that  
they can procure, learn to use and deploy weapons of different kinds.  
Simple tactical moves are near impossible if not impossible to the current lines of lethal autonomous robot warriors.  A 
gunnery station could run out of ammunition yet be incapable of collecting a rifle of a fallen adversary and deploying the  
same in combat as a weapon – this is because most robots are designed with specific missions in mind with little or no 
actuators that mimic or supersede the degrees of freedom of human limbs.  These shortcoming are a consequence of current 
scientific and technological knowledge levels of expert human beings :
1. Energy  densities  of  batteries  and  mini-generators  that  power  robots,  their  data-links,  processors,  sensor  and 
actuators, and the technical efficiency of energy usage by lethal autonomous weapon components
2. Inability of  lethal  autonomous  weapons  to  carry on-board  all  the  computational  power  for  fully autonomous 
operations, necessitates the dependence of data-links to external high-performance computing facilities
3. Lethal autonomous weapons are mission specific not designed as tactical competitors to human operatives
Pseudo-human lethal autonomous weapons would fill a design requirement gap herein named as  the “H-Gap”.
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3.1   Figure 5: The Conceptual Framework – Euler Diagram of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Design Variables
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From an intuitive analysis of the conceptual framework [25] above it is clear that there is considerable white background 
around the circle that is brown, that marks the domain of “everything possible that can go wrong” in a mission undertaken 
by way of a lethal autonomous weapon.   A segment of this white background is further demarcated by way of a non-linear  
line, this is the space of things that actually go wrong or do not occur as planned during any particular mission.  The whole  
non-linear line segment cutting into the brown circle is indicative of the mission complexity and requirement issues that  
come up during an mission for which a lethal autonomous weapon is not optimized to react to but it can detect and record.  
The non-linear line segment in the light blue circle is indicative of challenges that a lethal autonomous weapon encountered 
and reacted to appropriately due to its design.
The extent of the Architectural Framework is indicated by way of the two tipped light green arrow in the centre of the light  
blue  circle(the  Architectural  Framework).   These  are  the  primary  design  variables  that  influence  design, 
engineering/implementation of a lethal autonomous weapon.  After a security/military mission, computer programmers and  
systems analysts  attempt to cover an ever  wider  scope of  mission complexity/requirements  before the next mission is 
undertaken – inevitably the extent of the Architectural Framework is expanded.  Improvements result in ever greater design  
complexity,  these in  turn increase  the  scope of  catastrophic failures  that  may occur during a  mission.   An expanding 
Architectural Framework seeks to deploy more redundancies in a bid to boost fault tolerance which inevitably increases the 
complexity and types of pre-mission testing and maintenance tasks.
Some schematics capability provided for via a Project Management software application can facilitate for the layout of 
similar  conceptual  frameworks in  the course of  lethal  autonomous weapon projects.   Such provision would render  a  
visualization that would aid budget allocation for mission challenge/problem solving.  Visualization of a project related 
conceptual framework may aid in the determination of most effective project teams at various stages.  In the absence of 
project management applications the same nature of analytic overview and task visualization could be achieved by way of a  
Spreadsheet  application  package.  The  conceptual  frameworks  of  similar  scope  and  type  may  also  be  sourced  from 
information systems for tactical analysis that simulate performance and functions of weapons.
A periodic analysis of conceptual framework scope for different projects but sourced from the same methods and systems  
would be a pointer to overall project implementation efficiency.  Information Systems professionals would be in a position 
to determine how to optimize the performance of project teams and to minimize wastage and task duplication.  In this  
respect the conceptual framework has got theoretical as well as practical implications/applications.  In the above described  
conceptual framework the variables are described as follows:
1. Independent variables – Mission Complexity/Requirements
2. Dependent variables – Design Complexity based upon the Architectural Framework 
3. Intervening variables – Systems Analysis & Design (SAD) work
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3.2  Discussion  
In the “mind and thinking” of a lethal autonomous weapons the Mission Complexity/Requirements are actually a series of  
Computational  problems, that  assessed and analyzed with varying degree of Computational  Difficulty.   The Computer  
Science domain of Computational Complexity has a role to play in meeting and superseding the challenges of Mission  
Requirements/Complexity.  There is an additional task of discovery of unknowns and contingencies that cannot be resolved 
by on-board autonomous reasoning capabilities of the weapon and that are therefore sent off-board to command centres and 
high-performance computing facilities for determination.  Secure communication via data-links of these scenarios is part  
and parcel of autonomous function off-board.  The Weapon Use Domain indicates the performance parameters within which  
the weapon responds to a mission as designed.
Demaine [26] lays out the basic concepts of computing in terse clarity, these are important when considering the “hows and  
whys” of computation capabilities in future autonomous weapons.  Of great interest is his assertion that there are more 
decision problems than computer algorithms/programs to solve them.  An assumption is made that a computer program is a 
finite string of binary bits, hence its is assumed that the number of computer programs are countably infinite  |N|  while 
decision problems are denoted by |R| are uncountably infinite.  |R|>>|N| therefore indicates a special problem for designers 
of lethal autonomous systems, to the extent that there are ever more decision problems to be solved in an operation than are  
the number of computation tools/systems to resolve them.  
With the |R|>>|N| assumption and considering lethal autonomous devices/weapons are in effect systems that undertake to 
resolve decision problems, it is safe to assume that their designs shall always be inadequate unless and until something  
beyond normal computing is developed e.g. development of “spontaneous” algorithms to handle the infinite chaos arising 
from signal noise and relevant signals.   These “spontaneous” algorithms would further be mutated by way of genetic  
algorithms with a view of optimizing their performance.  The critical challenge to the concept of a “spontaneous” algorithm 
would be that of sensor and actuator efficiency, as such partially-efficient or incomplete perception signals from sensors  
shall result in generation of erroneous and/or hazardous spontaneous algorithms.  
“Spontaneous” algorithm solutions are classified as non-deterministic polynomial time problems in Computation Theory.  If 
an autonomous weapon system encounters a NP – hard problem (one that manifests all forms of computational challenges 
found in the NP problems) or other #P – complete problem(one that is more hard than an NP-complete problem), it would  
depend on external computational capacity to resolve it.  The NP – hard problem would be discovered and packaged before  
being sent of via a secure data-link to a high-performance computing facility. The size and scope of autonomous lethal  
weapons contemplated in this paper assumes that they cannot carry such computational capabilities on-board, this shall  
remain true to the extent that quantum computers in particular are not mobile and/or portable.
Even the seemingly autonomous fielded human soldiers  are dependent upon expertise of  other  persons not  physically 
present in their immediate area of operations, the availability of these requirements for consultation are is accessed via 
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military radio tactical radios – that in many instances offer some form of secure data communications.
3.3  Conclusion   
New and emerging ideas have the challenge of overcoming the resistance that is the current Establishment.  New thinkers  
often lack the ways and means for propagating their new ideas.  With a lot of investment into the human soldier and manned 
weapon systems, the logic of unmanned autonomous systems has a ready-made market barrier.  In general barriers for  
adoption of lethal autonomous systems technology include:
1. Some commanders may prefer manned systems
2. Lack of trained personnel capable of designing, developing and implementing lethal autonomous systems
3. Lack of  industrial base for manufacture i.e. an interested entity may not have access to components
4. Almost intractable engineering problems e.g. energy and endurance of robots in operations, degrees of freedom of 
movement
5. Autonomous weapons are likely to have very specific objectives and may not wholly “comprehend” the overall  
tactical situation 
6. Determination of on-board and off-board computation capabilities of lethal autonomous systems
7. Data-links and data-communications security against problems such as jamming, interception, alteration.
8. Lack of appropriate technologies e.g. nano-technology, self-assembly, spontaneous algorithm generation.
9. Resistance from human rights activists, skeptics, etc.
10. Fast  pace  of  development  of  computer  technology  making  it  likely  that  tech-saavy  adversaries  may  be  in  
possession of better performing autonomous weapons
11. Lack of appropriate design and performance bench-marks
12. Lack of testing in real combat situations, appropriate testing situations may take place in parts of the world that are  
far away from manufacturers.  When they occur there is not only the distance-time disconnect but the situations 
arise in different countries under different cultures and government.  This results in the challenge of adoption of the  
“alien” technology.
To overcome the financial challenge of developing lethal robots some business establishments [29] have resorted to use of 
investors rather than long-term, government funding contracts.  Most of the technology for now works well in urban warfare 
environment as it is easy to get the components and to draw up appropriate systems integration frameworks.  Investor  
funded lethal robots have development spans of few months and cost a small proportion of those of government funded 
robots.  
Autonomy is still the key consideration of government funded lethal robot projects [30] especially in the United States of 
America, where it is envisaged that autonomous battlefield ground vehicles shall be operational by 2015.  There shall be a  
time when even the most complex hostage situations, e.g. piracy at sea, shall be resolved by autonomous“frog man” robots.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In modern warfare efficacy of a military organization is dependent upon its C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Computing, 
Communications,  Intelligence,  Surveillance,  Target  Acquisition  and  Reconnaissance)  methodologies,  infrastructure  and 
practice.  A premium is placed on the ability of a military/security organization, to obtain empirically validated ( e. g. Battle 
damage assessments) tactical objectives with the least force, least cost and within stipulated time windows.  The factor of  
least  cost  and proportionality of force in military operations,  may be achieved by way of  deploying autonomous war-
fighting agents such as robots, in some operational instances.
Deployment  of  lethal  autonomous  weapons  allows  for  greater  risk  exposure,  at  greatly  minimized  costs  in  terms  of 
resources  such  as  lives  of  mortal  irreplaceable human operatives,  there  is  also more  efficient  automated execution of 
military commands within reduced time-frames and with greatly reduced costs to humans by way of less mental stress, less 
financial  strains  and  lower  psychological  burdens.   But  the  emerging  benefits  of  war-fighting  automation  has  got  its 
challenges, these being:
1. establishment of appropriate architectural frameworks to ensure that automation in war-fighting is conducted by 
hardware platforms and software environments, that are of excellent operational characteristics and design qualities
2. Production of automated war-fighting agents that are not only technically efficient, but also effective in operating 
within the bounds of local legislation and international humanitarian law.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
In today's conflicts it is ever more difficult to distinguish whether military force or police-based law enforcement suffices to 
neutralize an adversary, especially of an asymmetric-type.  Given that the area of operations in an asymmetric conflict may 
be expansive and the actors sparsely situated within the battle-space, there is a need to utilize “smart” methods that embrace  
network-integrated sensors, social network visualization, human intelligence analysis, computers, actuators and systems, to  
increase the efficacy in tactical operations.  A commander not only seeks to conduct operations, but also needs to ensure  
detailed data outflows are obtained from tactical operations to aid future operations and/or training sessions e.g. by way of  
deploying solutions based on Bayesian Modeling
Deployment of autonomous war-fighting agents whose functions are based upon computing information systems is likely to 
meet and exceed expectations of a command, but only if these vehicles are designed within the appropriate Architectural  
Frameworks.  The multifaceted nature of conflict today in land, air and naval environments demands that automation in  
combat aggregates disparate gains to obtain an overall military objective.
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1.2 Research Question
The general question is: What would be a generic architectural framework for designing, developing and implementing 
autonomous  war-fighting  agents  for  aggregation  of  gains  obtained  via  multifaceted  tactical  environments,  be?   The 
practicality of the same would have to be demonstrated by way of analysis.  Robust and versatile functionality would be 
critical in the realm of military/security operations.
1.3 Objectives
The research project arising from this study, establishes a C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for designing, developing and  
implementing  autonomous  tactical/war-fighting  agents  that  are  network-integrated.   The  autonomous  tactical  agents 
developed within the Framework shall have appropriate :
1.  Systems Architecture Frameworks
2.  Operational Architecture Frameworks 
3.  Technical Architecture Frameworks
4.  Appropriate theoretical demonstrator modules
           1.4  Justification
The research work shall establish and layout vital concepts that ensure that its generic autonomous war-fighting agents are  
safe to use and effective in executing any prescribed tactical operation.  The originator of the study is cognizant of the fact  
that Kenya, the country within which the research is to be done is considered to be a third world and underdeveloped nation.
The architectural framework to be prepared shall have a stimulating effect in creating well engineered systems and products  
such as : unmanned aerial vehicles, missiles, advanced radar systems, jet-engines, electronic computing systems, robots, 
sensor-technologies,  and many other  potentially low-cost investment but high return systems.  When these components are 
network-integrated  there  shall  create  multifaceted  combat  technologies  for  ground,  air  and  naval  operations  that  have 
appropriate Machine Learning algorithms and Tactical Heuristics.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
An architectural framework  for a military type automated system has three primary components, namely:
Technical Architecture
Operational Architecture
Systems Architecture
These specify the design, interlinking, functionality and usage of technologies such as:  Actuators, Radars, Sensors, Circuits,  
Data-links,  Image/schematics  matching,  Launchers,  Platforms,  Projectiles/Missiles,  Navigation  Systems,  Computer 
Programs; the objectives within the confines of this proposed Research Study would be to design and develop concepts for  
operating of autonomous war-fighting agents.  To demonstrate the robust grounding of this proposed research work, Journal  
Articles,  White Papers,  Books,  Primary Industrial/Institutional  sources,  have been reviewed and analyzed, a sample of  
which is rendered in this study.
2.1  A Sample of the Data-set
Automated control systems are dependent upon perceiving their operational environments with sensors, executing digital 
signal processing of sensor data streams, analyzing the deduced “perceptions” with preloaded heuristics and generating 
resultant control decisions which are used to manipulate their operational environments by way of actuators or additional  
projected autonomous agents.  Upon actuation of a control decision, the sensors obtain feedback of extent of compliance or 
non-compliance  thereby  creating  a  feedback  loop.   Heuristics,  past  perceptions,  recent  perceptions,  executed  control 
decisions, and other system parameters are stored and manipulated in the memory of the automated control system.
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Figure A: Automated war-fighting/Tactical Agent Schematics
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The concept automation is ably illustrated by Distefano et al [1] and Grant and Kooter [2].  Rizwan [3] elaborates how the 
Revolution in Military Affairs, has created an enabling environment that can today be associated with network-integrated  
and autonomous war-fighting capabilities.  This is highlighted by the way in which  the microchip has come to be a critical  
component of very many military systems.  Rizwan goes on to detail the “Joint Force 2010” concept as postulated by 
General Shalikashral.  Quantum computing and its related nano-components also offer new avenues for innovation in the  
realm of autonomous war-fighting 
Critical  to  the  “Joint  Force  2010”  concept  is  the  theme  of  Total  Dominance  i.e.  Dominant  Manoeuvre,  Precision  
Engagement, Full Dimension Protection and Focused Logistics, these have also come to be the underlying concepts in  
Architectures of Autonomous Weapons.
In  the realm of Unmanned Aerial  Vehicles  (UAVs) there is  an ever  growing embodiment of  autonomous war-fighting 
Dominant Manoeuvre is exemplified by the way in which disparately fielded UAVs can be automatically focused to obtain  
one  particular  military  objective.    Precision  Engagement  is  today  demonstrated  by  interdicting  targets  with  use  of  
“smart”/autonomous  munitions,  while  Full  Dimensional  Protection  is  illustrated  by  broad  ranging  integrated  systems 
engineering practice such as materials selection, electromagnetic hardening, electronic counter-measures,  etc.   Focused 
Logistics demands precision timing, navigation, essential payload and optimal workload.
Efficiency in war-fighting has a deterrent effect on potential adversaries but pursuit of Total Dominance via the Autonomous 
war-fighting track has got its firm opponents.  KRC (“Killer Robots Campaign”) Statement [4] lists some of the most 
vehement opponents of autonomous robots in warfare.  But warfare of the autonomous type is not very easily defined, the  
“split hair” arguments are the basis of highly discriminative application.  To the common man an autonomous robot moves  
around continuously searching for  targets,  after  which it  automatically qualifies  and interdicts  the  target.   One would 
imagine a robot moving and shooting at individuals.  But even a passive homing anti-tank missile without control from the 
launcher is an autonomous robot once it is fired at a target – it is a robot which has a course of action(s) based on preloaded  
heuristics, and so are “smart” artillery munitions or even seismic sensing detonated munitions. 
From a lethal autonomous weapons proponent's  perspective several technological methods may be deployed to address 
humanitarian concerns, some of these are:
1.  continuous updating of robotic algorithms with new algorithms and knowledge via data-links
2.  “Perfect algorithms” that can address any tactical scenario and contingency
3.  Building “humanitarian algorithms” for aborting tactical operations, when unforeseen challenges arise
4.  Utilizing several different sensor types to verify a target before action
5.  Quality assurance standards and inspections for autonomous war-fighting systems design, development, implementation  
     and operation.  This in turn reduces technical failure rates and malfunctions.  Committee on Armed Service United States  
    Senate [5] Report addresses the issue of standards and quality assurance especially in the realm of electronic components, 
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circuitry and related  systems.   The proliferation of  counterfeit  electronic  components  in  the  global  supply chain,  has  
impacted negatively on the systems business by way of downtime increase, malfunctions, technical failures and related  
catastrophic disasters.  Military forces such as the Armed Forces of the United States of America, have become proactive at  
identifying the problem of electronic component counterfeits within their systems and are demanding that manufacturers  
abide by certain standards. 
Components that are integrated to form a system are vital, and equally vital are the people who deploy the technology and  
the  processes/policies  followed  in  deploying  technologies.   Processes  include  planning,  design,  development, 
implementation, training, operation, maintenance and upgrades.  Personnel must have the requisite skills as acquired by way 
of training, education and experience.  The triad of People, Processes and Technology is captured in Fawcett [6] where the  
researcher states that Russian war planners concluded that in the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) against Iraq, the Allies  
prevailed not only because they had the requisite technologies but more so that they were well trained (equipped with the  
relevant skill-sets) in addition to the hi-tech weapon systems.  The paper alludes to the issue of motivation/willingness as the 
Allied Forces comprised of volunteer professional soldiers while those on the Iraqi side were mainly conscripts, this further 
captures the issue of combatant credibility.
We may extend personnel/people issues to those of honesty or otherwise – what is the credibility of the persons taking part  
in an operation?  Credibility is critical because in the realm of fully lethal autonomous weapons, there are no soldiers or  
operators, they may only serve in roles as programmers, analysts, and designers who pre-load the autonomous weapon 
system with the relevant programming algorithms and logistics.  Vertegaal [7] renders a system analysis and design concept  
developed in an era where the human user, was the “termination” and “initiating” point in military tactical networks.  This  
concept also holds true for Hon [8], with the critical difference being that the prosecution of multifaceted  warfare in a  
network-integrated manner was to be conducted by operatives linked to knowledge-based elements.  Though not explicitly 
mentioned therein, it is not difficult to conceive a network in which those elements are lethal autonomous weapons or their  
supporting systems.
With growing demand for network-integrated tactical systems, the integrity of data-links is an issue, for example:
1.  Credibility of equipment/services suppliers
2.  Technologies availed by suppliers
3.  Standards set by government bodies
Ruppersberger [9] also touches on the dimension of supplier credibility as is the report [5] of the United States Senate 
Armed Services Committee, analyzing the infiltration of counterfeit electronic components into the U.S. Military Supply 
Chain, there was special scrutiny given to suppliers from sources outside the United States of America.  In this report [9] it  
was the Telecommunication Service Providers who came in for special scrutiny, the likelihood of espionage and sabotage  
via their networks and related equipment is evaluated.  Systems and technical architectural frameworks must address supply  
chain risks if operational risks are to be minimized.
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Over open networks such as the Internet, or any other  potentially open communications media and protocols, the likelihood 
of adversaries seeking to  subvert the systems functions arises.  The downing of a United States Air Force drone over Iran is  
a demonstration of this norm [10].  These challenges are likely to come in two different forms, that may be combined in  
some instances, they are:
1.  Use of malware to subvert an autonomous system
2.  Interactive interventions by a human person via a network which is connected via electromagnetic waves
The first  type  of  these  is  detailed by Sabovich and  Borst  [11],  that  advocates  for  the deployment  of  various systems 
engineering techniques, in preventing or containing malware challenges.  Research arising from this study shall also cover a  
number of approaches in containing the threat of interactive intrusions.  Emphasis shall be placed on the development and  
justification of new policy types as the  primary basis  of shielding networks hosting autonomous war-fighting agents from  
unauthorized external interactions or attacks.
Gompert and Saunders [12] explores issues of cyber-warfare in the context of a potential conflict between the Peoples 
Republic of China and the United States of America.  This is a theater of the vaunted United States Military Strategy that is  
Air-Sea Battle, a concept dependent on processes such as automation and digitization.  It  further highlights the issue of 
network security in the realm of autonomous war-fighting  Other additional concepts that are explored as those of mutual  
deterrence in the realm of cyber-warfare.
The concept of allowing for the redirection and reprogramming of autonomous lethal weapons that are fielded is important.  
Even with the inherent risks of hacking and malware, there are benefits in “flipping the script” and “shifting the goal posts”  
via a data-link when the “game” that is war is well underway.  Military operations in most respects are dynamic, potentially  
unpredictable and require prompt decision making to cope with emerging threats and opportunities.  It is very difficult if not 
impossible to come up with systems heuristics that can handle all manner of potential contingencies.  Even human beings 
when fielded in a tactical operation often engage in collaborative thinking/group work or consultations via radio/data-links, 
when unforeseen contingencies are encountered.
Data from lethal autonomous weapons would be streamed back to a commander at a center, where the original intentions  
and objectives of unleashing such a system into the open environment that is a battle-space are known.  The consoles at  
command stations are continuously monitored with a view to determining if strategic and tactical military objectives are  
being obtained.  Blanco [13] offers empirically validated  technical solutions, for determining whether those monitoring 
consoles are alert and aware of the overall situation.   There is no limit to potential application of the same technologies at  
command  centers  where  staff  are  monitoring  feedback  from  autonomous  war-fighting  systems  in  the  field.   The 
alertness/awareness of a commander is also vital in determining  if there is an ongoing or successful attempt, at disabling or 
disrupting the original preloaded objectives of an autonomous weapon by a hacker or malware.
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2.2  Conclusion
Traditional military rules and regulations have been formed for well over a century.  They are generalized as International 
Humanitarian Law, that is manifested by the Hague and Geneva Conventions, etc.  it is not easy to get a change of these  
statutes.  The widespread availability and affordability of dual use robot technology components, and the prevalence of 
robotics in almost every human endeavour makes it highly unlikely that an effective ban on lethal autonomous weapons  
shall ever come into effect as an integral part of what is today known as International Humanitarian Law.  A prudent military 
force must be prepared for the eventuality that is autonomous war-fighting  The experience of this researcher in this the 
domain of training military/security forces, is based not only on hind sight but also with the credible foresight that the 
Kenya Defence Forces and its Allies should not lag behind the world's fast changing military operations theatre that is  
embracing autonomy in tactical operations.
Implementing  Lethal  Autonomy  with  the  current  technological  limitations  implies  that  systems  are  not  as  highly 
discriminative when picking and engaging targets as may be desired by a commander.  They may require the input of  
humans “in the loop” to make a final decision in some cases, while other systems like fully automated anti-ballistic missile  
defense system may not need human input though they do offer the option.  Military weapons and/or their uses must meet  
certain critical International Humanitarian Law criteria:
1.  They must be capable of making a distinction whether a potential target is a friend, neutral or a foe
2.  All military attacks must be of a justifiable nature, e.g. wholly unprovoked attacks are considered to be war crimes, 
     another element of law is that weapons used must have only sufficient effects, over-kills are illegal.
3.  Battle injuries caused by weapons must not be aggravated beyond the extent of neutralizing a combatant, e.g. Weapons 
     must not cause intentional infections or intentionally untreatable injuries
4.  Weapons must allow only targeted and highly discriminative use
5.  Adequate care must be taken not to kill or wound non-combatants, that includes giving them warnings
6.  Weapons that cannot have limited usage must not be deployed
Robots are common feature in human lives for a wide range of functions/applications e.g. transport, medicine, etc.  Can it be 
claimed that there should be a pact between human and machines? Or are machines an extension and manifestation of 
human intelligence?  Lethal autonomy increases the ease with which human life can be taken or degraded, the decision to 
deploy such technology must not be taken lightly.  But there are still a wide range of factors e.g. experience and intelligence  
borne by human war-fighters that cannot be easily codified for use in the domain of warfare.  Nevertheless the ease with  
which electronic components such as actuators and chips can be obtained and programmed implies that lethal autonomy is  
at least inevitable in the domain of non-state actors, it offers them an anonymous means of projecting and executing their 
power unlike any other time in history.
Apart from surveillance and target acquisition, robots may need to analyze the intentions of human beings.  This is one of  
the greatest  challenges,  other  challenges include codification of  empathy with human persons.   It  is  only of  late  that  
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technology for remote credibility analysis of humans are being developed and deployed e.g. stress analysis via thermal  
imaging but these are not yet robust to the extent of being used with consistently good results.  Contrary to popular belief 
there are a wide range of fully autonomous weapon systems that are currently in use by military forces e.g. Sensors that  
detonate explosive charges when they are interfered with, but of the current fielded systems there is none that can readily 
tap into the human mental process and know how to harness its feedback.
A critical point of interest for most military and security forces in the domain of war-fighting would be safety and reliability  
issues, autonomous robots remove the human user risk.  But the variables are still very many, and it is too difficult to  
determine  which  technologies  shall  result  from the  current  emerging experiences  in  the  course  of  tactical  operations.  
Human beings are capable of  harnessing fine grained ethical  and legal  decision making processes that  are difficult  to  
technically replicate, this is the major challenge to developing lethal autonomy, there are operational circumstances that are 
difficult  to predict/foresee and codify until  they actually occur.     The potential  broad spectrum applicability of lethal  
autonomy shall disadvantage any military/security force that has its State ratify any “global” ban.  Arguments about the  
benefits and paybacks of deploying or not deploying autonomy are becoming mainstay in evermore domains of human life,  
for knowledgeable non-state belligerents lethal autonomy is an option.
Currently the United States of America's Department of Defense was one of the first institutions to come up with a directive 
policy [14] for autonomous weapon systems usage.  It answers the question that is the yearning of many i.e. A human in the  
loop at the point of firing a weapon on an autonomous platform, but as robots become ever more fast in decision making,  
this cardinal principle shall inevitably be compromised with a view to interdicting threatening targets before they can do  
harm to interests protected by lethal autonomous weapons.  There shall be a much faster target acquisition and interdiction  
loop, may be in the scale of milliseconds and human contribution to the same shall be minimal if not impossible.
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Chapter Three
Research Methodology
Lethal  autonomous weapons  are spinoffs  of  technical  advances in  fields  such as  robotics,  computing,  navigation,  etc. 
Versatility, flexibility, ingenuity and urgency of deployment of newly emerging technologies inevitably applies pressure on 
weapons systems engineers to come up with appropriate systems integration/engineering concepts that exploit advances in  
the  domain  of  sci-tech.   This  inter-disciplinary  approach  to  providing  autonomous  agents  has  a  lot  of  traction  with  
commanders  who  can  get  ever  greater  tactical  payoffs  with  ever  diminishing  human  risk  exposure.   Searches  for 
information and data that actualizes the benefits of lethal autonomy takes place over diverse specialties and various experts  
may not be forewarned of the use of their research in this domain.
To come up with a comprehensive and broad spectrum Architectural Framework for lethal autonomous weapons, a lot of 
white papers, journals, books, theses, and other research materials shall be reviewed repeatedly by the researcher.  
3.1 Qualitative analysis of the Research Problem
The objective of the proposed research work develop a C4ISTAR Architectural Framework that guides in the development  
of weapons that manifest lethal autonomy.  There is already an ever growing body of literature on lethal autonomy, that is  
broad and rich in insights.  The method adopted for the study is the Qualitative Analysis.  The specific approach shall be the  
Grounded Theory Method of Qualitative Analysis.
3.2 Research Methodology – Grounded Theory Method 
Research work undertaken by way of the Grounded Theory Method shall be done as follows:
1. Conducting a relevant literature search from libraries, databases, digital libraries, media monitoring, etc. to produce 
an initial examinable data set.  Consultations with various experts shall be undertaken during the whole course of  
my research work.
2. This initial data-set shall be reviewed by the researcher for relevance and potential utility, with a view of scoring 
the sources for relevance and making a determination as to the sufficiency of the data-set.
3. The qualified data-set shall then be obtained and stored in hard or soft copy format and cataloged/indexed by the  
researcher for easy/quick reference.
4. This qualified data-set shall be reviewed severally with a view to enabling the researcher to understand its contents  
and contexts, and to draw-up initial working summaries to be used in the qualitative analysis [17].
5. More sources shall be sought to support or disprove the initial working summaries.
6. An initial research paper is then drawn up by way of qualitative analysis of the refined data-set is the Grounded  
Theory [20] developed by way of appreciating and integrating the contexts and contents of the disparate research 
sources.  In line with the principles of Leshem [21] a conceptual framework is drawn-up based upon the research 
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work, that details the interactions between the variables discovered in the course of research.
7. The initial research paper is then reviewed by selected Academic Readers, to determine the extent to which the  
initial research study is manifested via the research work and if the work is adequate in terms of form, contexts, 
contents and knowledge.
8. Readers give the researcher feedback which is incorporated into a review of the paper after which the Paper upon 
approval is submitted for publication
3.3 Dissemination Strategy
The research work shall be published in several papers, some of these shall have direct peer-review, and others published on 
expert  refereed online platforms or online platforms that  allow for peer citation counts.   The major by-product of the  
research shall be robust lethal autonomous weapons systems, these shall be conceptualized, designed and developed by 
outfits selected by the researcher and used in accordance with existing laws.  Academic conferences and seminars shall also  
offer the researcher a mode of peer-reviewed dissemination.  Academic work such as training and education shall also  
provide a powerful method for the research dissemination.
3.4 Conclusion
There was a wide range of potential research resources, this made it feasible for the research work to be undertaken.  Some 
may view the Grounded Theory Method of conducting research as a subversion [18] of quantitative methods, but that is not  
the case as the research data-sets obtained qualitatively also contain quantitative and empirically generated data-sets that can 
only be analyzed by way of their original quantitative analysis mechanisms within a Grounded Theory Method.   Research  
is basically a learning process [19], and in all likelihood new approaches and knowledge that was not envisioned in the  
initial objectives may be obtained.
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1.  Reader::  David K. Ngondi, works at the Directorate of Police Reforms of the Kenya Police 
    Service and has several decades of experience in a broad-spectrum of security and para-military       
    operations.  He posses a Master of Arts degree in Security Studies from the University of Hull in the 
   UK.
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